The Finley Firm is pleased to announce the additions of Kindu A. Walker, Esq. and Michael E. Memberg, Esq.
Kindu A. Walker joins The Finley Firm, P.C. as an associate. His practice areas will focus on general civil litigation with a concentration in products liability, automotive litigation, premises liability and civil rights defense of governmental entities.
Michael E. Memberg joins The Finley Firm, P.C. as an associate. His practice areas will focus on civil litigation and workers’ compensation.
For more information, please visit The Finley Firm website at www.thefinleyfirm.com.
Upcoming Events
January 14, 2009-Sponsoring the Rimkus Seminar at the Villa Christina.
February 5-6, 2009-Sponsoring Atlanta RIMS Conference at Crowne Plaza Ravinia.
February 26, 2009-Mark your Calendars! The Finley Firm will be offering a FREE Continuing Education seminar, which will include 3 Ethics hours, 3 Regular hours and lunch at the Villa Christina. Topics include: investigating claims, damages, coverage and ethical dilemmas. More details coming soon! If you are interested in receiving the agenda, please email Vanessa Williams at vwilliams@thefinleyfirm.com or watch for details on our website at www.thefinleyfirm.com.
March 1, 2009-The spring update to The Georgia Environmental Deskbook will be available.
Seminars
December 3, 2008-Greg Ragsdale and Kathy Rogers presented a crash course in Georgia Workers' Compensation to the Exopack Plant Supervisors. After the seminar was completed, Greg and Kathy toured the Albany plant.
This course covered the importance of preventing a workers' compensation claim and what you should do as a supervisor when a claim does occur. The course also explained why keeping the Panel of Physicians accurate is imperative.
December 12, 2008-Greg Ragsdale, Kathy Rogers and Kindu Walker presented Georgia State Board Forms: When are the Deadlines & Filing Requirements to the adjusters at Travelers Insurance.
During this course, the attorneys discuss with adjusters when to use the correct board form and when you should file the form.
For more information on The Finley Firm providing a seminar for your office, please contact Vanessa Williams at 404-320-9979.
Workers' Comp 7 Day Waiting Period
The Seven-Day Waiting Period for Worker’s Compensation Benefits in Georgia
The Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act provides for an initial seven-day waiting period before an injured employee can claim benefits for time missed from work due to an injury. The goal of the waiting period is to encourage employees to return to work after minor injuries and to reduce the burden on the Board for the volume of claims. The seven days are aggregate and do not have to be consecutive. The days themselves are calendar days, not work days and not even scheduled work days. If someone gets hurt at work, the seven days count off as long as he is unable to work, regardless of whether he is missing scheduled time. Counting starts on the first day the employee cannot work a full day because of the injury. Thus, the first day can be the date of injury, but if he is paid for the full day on the date of injury, the counting starts the next day. Employers only owe medical for the seven days unless the employee ends up missing twenty-one consecutive days due to the injury.
For example, imagine that Joe gets hurt on December 5th and cannot work a full day. He is out 12/6-12/8, but works from 12/9-1/10. He then goes out until January 20. The seven days are December 5th, December 6th, December 7th, December 8th, January 11th, January 12th, January 13th. At this point, Joe is owed medical only through January 13th, and he would be due one week of income benefits from 1/14-1/20. If he stayed out through January 31st, he would at that point be out for 21 consecutive days. Thus, he would be owed benefits for the seven-day waiting period, even though those days were not all in one week.
If you have any questions regarding the seven day waiting period or any other workers’ compensation issue, please contact M. Kathryn Rogers at 404-320-9979.
Workers' Comp Self-Insurance
Georgia employers may self-insure for workers’ compensation coverage. The Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act and the rules of the State Board govern workers’ compensation self-insurance. An employer who wishes to self-insure must apply for a certificate from the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (“SBWC”) and the Self-Insurers Guaranty Trust Fund (“SIGTF”). The SIGTF website (http://www.gaguaranty.com/) contains all the forms necessary to apply to be a self-insurer, as well as other background information.
With respect to managing self-insurers, the requirements in Board Rule 121 and Board Rule 127 provide that an out-of-state claims agent may manage claims if it is registered with the Georgia Department of Insurance, designates local “resident” agent to sign checks drawn on a Georgia-based account, maintains regular office hours, and provide an 800 number to be contacted by the public and the SBWC.
If you have any questions regarding becoming self-insured for workers’ compensation coverage in Georgia or administering claims for a self-insurer in Georgia, please contact C. Gregory Ragsdale at 404-320-9979.
The Traveling Employee
Under Georgia’s “continuous employment doctrine,” where the employee is living or traveling out of town on company business, an employee’s injuries may be compensable, even where the injuries occur off of company property and while the employee is engaged in personal activities. Under the “continuous employment doctrine,” all acts, including recreational activities, provided they are performed in a reasonable and prudent manner for the health and comfort of the traveling, or continuous, employee, arise out of and are in the course of employment. Such injuries are therefore considered compensable as incidents of employment. In the case of McDonald v. State Hwy. Dept ., 127 Ga. App. 171, 175-176 (1972), for example, workers’ compensation benefits were awarded to a traveling employee who was injured after he catered to his personal comforts by consuming alcoholic beverages and playing cards since these activities were not considered “wholly foreign to his employment.”
As liberal as the McDonald finding may seem, injuries will not be covered if they occur during activities undertaken by traveling employees which are held not to be reasonable and prudent. For example, in Williams v. Atlanta Family Restaurants , 204 Ga. App. 343, 345-346 (1992), workers’ compensation benefits were denied to a traveling employee who, while staying in an out-of-town hotel, went to another location to do laundry and accepted a ride back to her hotel from strangers, rather than accepting a ride from her employer’s supervisory personnel. There, the employee’s injuries occurred as a result of a criminal assault that occurred during the ride and thus were not compensable. The court held that her actions were not “normal or prudent” under the circumstances. Furthermore, it is possible for a traveling employee to engage in personal activities which are not performed for the health and comfort of the employee, and are therefore, not covered activities. When the activities are considered personal and not related to the health and comfort of the traveling employee, the issue becomes determining when the traveling employee completed the personal excursion and resumed continuous employment. In London Guarantee, etc. Co. v. Herndon, 81 Ga. App. 178, 181 (1950), the court held that the employee resumes continuous employment when he or she is “in the general proximity of the place where he was employed to be and at a time he was employed to be in that general proximity.”
The Supreme Court recently applied this “general proximity” rule in Ray Bell Const. Co., et al. v. King, 281 Ga. 853 (2007). In Ray , the Court upheld the appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation’s finding that an employee, who was living in a company apartment out of town for work and who was returning from a personal excursion unrelated to his health and comfort, had resumed continuous employment at the time he was killed in an automobile accident in the county adjacent to where the job site and the company apartment where he was staying were located. This case, decided in 2007, represents an expansion of the continuous employment rule insofar as it concludes that the employee was in the “general proximity” of his place of employment despite the fact that he was in a different county at the time of his accident. The Court noted that the findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation are “conclusive and binding” when supported by “any evidence,” and the Court accepted, with very little discussion, the appellate division’s finding that the employee’s deviation from employment had ended and that the employee had resumed his employer’s business when he was killed. The Court explained that the determination of whether he had returned to the general proximity of the employment was a question of fact for the appellate division. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the Court concluded simply that the employee resumed his employer’s business when he returned to the “general proximity of the Fayetteville-Jackson area.” The Ray decision was close (split 4 to 3), and the dissent took issue with the majority’s broad characterization of general proximity. Citing Herndon for the proposition that “a substantial deviation [outside the area of employment] may lead to a conclusion that an injury sustained while returning from the [personal] mission does not arise out of or in the course of employment,” the dissent concluded that the employee should not have been entitled to benefits. The dissent came to its conclusion based on the fact that at the time of the accident, the employee was not in the general proximity of Alamo, Georgia, the place of employment. The excursion was undisputedly, wholly personal, and the employee was on sick leave during the week of the excursion. Although, technically speaking, Ray Bell Construction has little precedential value because the Court was bound to accept the appellate court’s ruling on “any evidence,” plaintiffs’ attorney are certain use this holding to attempt to expand workers’ compensation eligibility under the “continuous employee doctrine.”
In conclusion, employers of traveling employees should be cognizant of developments in this area of the law, especially given the Ray decision. While the Ray decision seems to indicate a willingness on the part of Georgia courts to expand workers’ compensation eligibility under the “continuous employee doctrine,” the close split of opinion among the justices on the Georgia Supreme Court and the strong arguments offered by the dissent in that case may indicate that there is hope for better decisions to come.
If you have any questions about the doctrine of continuous employment, please contact Mary Lewis at 404-320-9979.
Offer of Settlement-Case Up-date
No. A08A1278
2008 WL 49391-7 (Ga. App., Nov. 20, 2008).
Olarsch and Newell were involved in a car accident in 2000, and Olarsch sued Newell in May 2004. The Georgia Tort Reform Act of 2005 became effective during the pendency of the litigation, which included the new offer of settlement rules. Olarsch rejected Newell’s offer of settlement, and Newell eventually received a verdict in his favor.
A defense verdict was entered on October 6, 2006. Olarsch filed various motions, included a motion for a new trial (MNT) and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on November 6, 2006, although the trial court did not enter its final judgment until November 8, 2006. Olarsch filed supplemental motions on November 20, 2006, including a motion for fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.
The trial court set a hearing for February 27, 2007. Olarsch’s counsel moved for a continuance based on personal injuries and a doctor’s out-of-work slip. The motion was denied and the hearing went forward without Olarsch or his counsel. On March 5, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying Olarsch’s MNT and JNOV. In a separate order, the trial court granted Newell’s motion for fees under the offer of settlement rules or under 9-15-14. Olarsch filed a notice of appeal of these orders on April 2, 2007, but the trial court denied his motion. Olarsch filed for discretionary appeal to Court of Appeals over this and various other frivolous issues.
The Court quickly disposed of Olarsch’s enumerations of error with respect to his MNT and JNOV. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39(b) prevents extension of time for these motions, so the requirement to file within 30 days of the entry of judgment was in force. Thus, because he filed the motions more than 30 days later, they were rightly denied.
On the other hand, the Court was not approving of the award of fees. First of all, the Court applied a recent Georgia Supreme Court decision that held that the Tort Reform Act could not retroactively apply to actions filed before it became effective. Fowler Props v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76, 77 (2007). With respect to the award of fees under 9-15-14, a trial judge has the discretion to award the fees, and the standard or review on appeal is abuse of discretion. Here, the Court found that the trial court’s order lacked specific findings of fact and that neither Olarsch nor his counsel was afforded the opportunity to confront and challenge testimony as to the value of fees to be awarded. Accordingly, the award of fees was vacated and the trial court was directed to hold a hearing consistent with this opinion and include findings in any award of fees.
Based on this holding, it is clear that a defendant cannot receive fees following an offer of settlement unless the initial action was filed on or after February 16, 2005, when the Georgia Tort Reform Act went into effect. Furthermore, if a motion for fees under 9-15-14 is filed, the other side must be given the opportunity to have a hearing on the issue. Finally, any proposed orders awarding fees should include specific findings of fact that form the basis of the award. If the award from the judge does not include specific findings, the prevailing party would be advised to request that the judge reconsider its award to include findings to reduce the likelihood that the Court of Appeals will reverse the award.
For more information, please contact Lara P. Percifield at 404-320-9979.
UM Coverage
Uninsured Motorist Coverage Stacking in Georgia
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion resolving two appeals arising from the same auto accident with respect to the priority of three liability and uninsured motorist (UM) insurance policies. Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4966217 (Ga. App. Nov. 24, 2008).
In general, Georgia law allows multiple UM policies to be stacked. Georgia courts employ three tests in determining the priority for stacking: 1) the “receipt of premium” test; 2) “the more closely indentified with” test; and 3) the “circumstances of the injury” test. Under the “receipt of premium” test, the insurer that receives a premium from the injured insured is deemed to be primarily responsible for providing coverage. Under the “more closely identified with” test, the policy with which the injured party is most closely identified must provide primary coverage. If neither of those tests is helpful in a particular case, the Courts look to the circumstances of the injury to see which policy provides primary coverage. Where one of the three tests for determining priority of UM coverage resolves the issue, Georgia courts have deemed it inappropriate to prorate stackable coverage as between uninsured motorist carriers.
In the reported cases, the receipt of premium test was of no avail because the same person paid the premiums on all the policies. The Court looked to the “more closely indentified” test, which does not focus on the relationship between the circumstances of the collision and a particular policy of insurance; it looks instead to the relationship of the injured party to the policy. Furthermore, the UM policies in this case contained provisions deeming the policies to be excess of other insurance. This Court held that the existence of such “other insurance” provisions does not preempt the application of one of the standard tests for determining priority. This holding was an extension of a prior decision to the “more closely identified” test, whereas before this rule has only been applied to “receipt of premium” cases.
The result of this case is that the UM policies were stacked in following order of priority: 1) decedent’s UM policy; 2) decedent’s father’s UM policy; 3) decedent’s father’s UM umbrella policy; 4) decedent’s sister’s UM policy with father added as a named insured. The Court’s rationale is that a child-parent relationship is “more closely identified” than a sibling relationship.
If you have any questions concerning the stacking of multiple UM policies, please contact Michelle LeGault at 404-320-9979.
Class Action
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions and Class Actions in the 11th Circuit
In 2007, The Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals issued an opinion that limited the enforceability of a class action waiver in a mandatory arbitration provision. In Dale v. Comcast, 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit held that the difficulty an individual has in obtaining legal representation where a small amount of damages is at stake under a statute with no fee-shifting provision could lead to unchecked unlawful market behavior. Id. Moreover, corporations should not be permitted to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for small-value claims. Id.
In early 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia issued an opinion that applied and interpreted Dale, providing insight on how courts in the Eleventh Circuit will enforce class action waivers in mandatory arbitration provisions. Honig v. Comcast of Ga. I, LLC , 537 F.Supp.2d 1277 (N.D.Ga. 2008), involved a putative class action regarding unauthorized charges on cable subscribers’ bills for a printed channel guide. Comcast’s subscriber agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision, although subscribers could opt-out within thirty days of signing the agreement. The arbitration provision stated that all parties be individually named, i.e. no class arbitration. Honig brought an action under the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (“GFBPA”), as well as various contract, tort, and fraud claims. Comcast moved to compel arbitration. The Honig Court granted Comcast’s motion, distinguishing the factors considered by the Court in Dale. In Dale , there was no fee-shifting provision that would allow the plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees if they prevailed. Ms. Honig brought her claim under the GFBPA, which unlike the Cable Act in Dale, does contain a fee-shifting provision. (The GFPBA also prohibits consumer class actions.) In fact, virtually every theory under which Ms. Honig sought recovery allowed for the recovery of attorneys fees and expenses if the plaintiffs prevailed. The Honig Court rejected plaintiff’s argument on the facts of the case, because recovery of fees was ample incentive for an attorney to represent her and pursue her claims in arbitration.
In Georgia, there is no strict prohibition on waivers of class arbitration. The Dale and Honig decisions identified factors a court will consider in evaluating the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision:
• Is the action brought under a statute with a fee-shifting provision; or is there a strong likelihood that legal fees may be awarded, e.g. for bad faith?
• Is there an opt-out provision in the arbitration provision?
• Is the arbitration agreement unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under state law governing contracts?
• Does state law prohibit consumer class actions?
• Does the corporate defendant have policies in place that make arbitration more practical for individuals?
• Does the contract allow a corporate defendant’s illegal market behavior to go unchecked?
If you have any questions regarding contracts containing mandatory arbitration provisions and whether you may have waived your right to institute or participate in a class arbitration, please contact J. Benjamin Finley or MaryBeth Gibson at 404-320-9979.
Insurance Coverage: “Traditional” vs. “Non-Traditional” Pollution
In 1985, the insurance industry introduced a new policy exclusion touted to be an “absolute” or “total” pollution exclusion. The exclusion replaced an earlier pollution exclusion often referred to as the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion that was the source of what one commentator has called, “the most hotly litigated insurance coverage questions of the late 1980s.”(1) Much like its predecessor, the absolute pollution exclusion is generating significant litigation in the area of vapor claims.
This is emphasized by recent opinions around the country differentiating “traditional” versus “non-traditional” pollution claims with vapor claims being classified under the non-traditional category. The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted this approach when it concluded a pollution exclusion clause was limited to “traditional” environmental pollution, and found coverage for a vapor claim. (2)Yet, there are jurisdictions that are not following this trend. Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court in Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Sand Livestock Systems, Inc.(3), recently rejected this idea of “traditional” versus “non-traditional” noting that carbon monoxide fumes from a concentrated hog farm were pollutants under the policy at issue. (4)
The argument comes down to the history of the absolute pollution exclusion. As argued in MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange (5) , the “pollution exclusion” was drafted in response to the marked increase in environmental liability associated with new environmental statutes and the “environmental disasters of Times Beach, Love Canal and Torrey Canyon.”(6) The first version of the exclusion - the so-called “qualified pollution exclusion” – excluded coverage for injuries and damages arising out of the “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” of “pollutants” unless such discharge dispersal, release or escape was “sudden and accidental.”(7) When the insurance industry revised the exclusion in 1985 to eliminate the exception for the “sudden and accidental” release of pollution, it maintained the revision was not intended to broaden the exclusion’s scope, but was merely intended to continue to “exclude traditional environmental pollution rather than all injuries from toxic substances.”(8)
Relying on this history, two lines of authority have developed in interpreting the revised “absolute” pollution exclusion. A majority of jurisdictions apply the exclusion to “traditional environmental pollution” but not to “injuries involving the negligent use or handling of toxic substances that occur in the normal course of business,” i.e. “non-traditional” pollutants.(9) These jurisdictions point to the “absurd or otherwise unacceptable results” of “an interpretation of ‘pollutant’ as applying literally to ‘any contaminant or irritant . . . .’” (10)They also focus on the common meaning of the term “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” as “implying expulsion of the pollutant over a considerable area rather than a localized toxic accident occurring in the vicinity of intended use.”(11) Examples of toxic accidents found not to be excluded include: the accidental spraying of insecticides, leaks of carbon monoxide from furnaces and the ingestion of paint chips.(12) On the other end of the debate are those minority of jurisdictions who rely on the “plain” language of the exclusion’s terms to hold that the “absolute” pollution exclusion is unambiguous and applies to all manner of negligent acts involving toxic substances even outside the scope of traditional environmental pollution.(13)
In the South, States are slowly adopting the “non-traditional” argument. Compare, Sullins v. Allstate Ins.Co., 667 A.2d 617 (Md. 1995), reconsid. Denied (Dec. 19, 1995) (exclusion does not apply to lead paint claim); Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ Inc., d/b/a Regency One Hour Cleaners, 926 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App.1996) (exclusion does not apply to carbon monoxide); Essex Ins. Co. v. Avondale Mills, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1339 (Ala. 1994) (exclusion does not apply to asbestos released during building demolition); West America Insurance Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1991) overruled on other grounds, ( styrene fumes from a floor re-surfacing job that contaminated chicken in a processing plant not excluded); Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So.2d 119 (La. 2000) (clause does not apply to all contact with substances that may be classified as pollutants); and State Auto Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2007 WL 1707358 (Ark. June 14, 2007) (finding the exclusion to be ambiguous), to State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Deni Associates of Florida, Inc., 678 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) (accidental ammonia spill from a blueprint machine excluded).
Until July of last year, Georgia appeared to side with majority. In the 2002 Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Kerr-McGee v. Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co., the Court interpreted an insurer’s total pollution exclusion clause as ambiguous, and thus not excluding coverage.(14) The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether its exclusion stating, “this insurance does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ which would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants at any time.”(15)
When an employee of the insured suffered injuries following his exposure to the unintended release of industrial chemical titanium tetrachloride within a plant not owned by the insured, the Court of Appeals determined the exclusion did not apply.(16) The Court explained a reasonable insured could believe the exclusion did not apply when the insured neither caused nor contributed to the pollution.(17) Key to this opinion, the Court determined the chemical release was not an environmental contamination and the chemical released was not a waste, but rather an industrial chemical.(18) Thus, by classifying the chemical as industrial, i.e. non-traditional, rather than waste – i.e. traditional, the Court found there was sufficient ambiguity in the policy to resolve it against the insurer as drafter.(19)
Yet, on July 16, 2007, the Court of Appeals in Auto-Owners, Inc. v. Reed, jumped lines on determining coverage under the “traditional” vs. “non-traditional” pollutant and the absolute pollution exclusion debate. In a 5/2 decision, the Court reversed the Butts County Superior Court’s order denying Auto-Owner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and found the absolute pollution exclusion of a CGL policy excluded coverage to a commercial landlord in a suit involving his tenant’s exposure to carbon monoxide.
On September 22, 2008, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, reversing the grant of summary judgment on the issue of coverage under an absolute pollution exclusion.(20) Recognizing the well established coverage rules in Georgia, the Court noted insurance companies are generally free to set the terms of their policies as they see fit so long as they do not violate the law or judicially cognizable public policy.(21) Thus, a carrier may agree to insure against certain risks while declining to insure against others.(22)
In construing an insurance policy in Georgia, courts begin, as with any contract, with the text of the contract itself.(23) Where the contractual language unambiguously governs the factual scenario before the court, the court’s job is simply to apply the terms of the contract as written, regardless of whether doing so benefits the carrier or the insured.(24) In Reed , the Court was faced with allegations of “bodily injury” from the “release” of carbon monoxide gas “at . . . [the] premises,” i.e., the rental house, “owned . . . by . . . [the] insured.” The ultimate question before the Court was, whether carbon monoxide gas is a “pollutant” – i.e., matter, in any state, acting as an “irritant or contaminant,” including “fumes.” In ruling against coverage found in other States, the Court held:
We need not consult a plethora of dictionaries and statutes to conclude that it is. After all, the very basis for Reed’s lawsuit is her claim that the release of carbon monoxide gas inside the rental house “poison[ed]” her, causing her to suffer difficulty breathing, dizziness, insomnia, vomiting, nausea, headaches, and decreased appetite. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the plain language of the pollution exclusion clause excludes Reed’s claim against Waldrop from coverage under the CGL policy.
In all, the Court’s ruling in Auto-Owners and departure from Kerr-Mcgee would seem to move Georgia out of the group of states that provides coverage under the absolute pollution exclusion where the pollutant is limited to an enclosed space. For now, exposures to chemicals in the workplace and home leave attorneys with heartburn when trying to advise insurers of coverage. Though Auto-Owners seems to have given some clarity to coverage, this may not be the decisive case on this issue, for even in jurisdictions who have adopted the “non-traditional” / historical line of analysis, a significant percentage have found carbon monoxide is a historically known and accepted “pollutant” and thus, nonetheless denied coverage. It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court would have adopted a different approach had the exposure been related to a household chemical.
(1)Stempel, J., Interpretation of Insurance Contracts: Law and Strategy for Insurers and Policyholders 825 (1994).
(2)Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Insurance Company of America, (NO. A–20/21. N.J. Supreme Ct., 2005).
(3)No. 135/05-1063, 2007 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 23 (Feb. 23, 2007).
(4)See also, Continental Casualty Company v. Advance Terrazzo & Tile Company, Inc., 462 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2006) (Minnesota law, an absolute pollution exclusion clause in a general liability policy held to be unambiguous as applied to pollutants occurring in the course of normal business activities).
(5)31 Cal. 4th 635, 642 n. 1 (Aug. 14, 2003).
(6)Id. at 643.
(7)Id. at 644.
(8)Id.
(9)Id. at 642.
(10)Id. at 645-46.
(11)Id. at 646.
(12)See Id. at 642 n.2.
(13)Id. at 646-47.
(14)256 Ga. App. 458 (2002).
(15)Id. at 461.
(16)Id.
(17)Id. at 462-463.
(18)Id. at 462-463.
(19)Id. at 464.
(20)Auto-Owners, Inc. v. Reed, 284 Ga. 286 (2008).
(21)Payne v. Twiggs County Sch. Dist., 269 Ga. 361, 363 (496 SE2d 690) (1998); Continental Cas. Co. v. HSI Fin. Svcs., 266 Ga. 260, 262 (466 SE2d 4) (1996).
(22)Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pat’s Rentals, 269 Ga. 691, 692 (505 SE2d 729) (1998); Park’n Go of Ga., Inc. v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 266 Ga. 787, 791 (471 SE2d 500) (1996).
(23)Payne, supra, 269 Ga. at 363. See Williams v. Fallaize Ins. Agency, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 411, 414 (469 SE2d 752) (1996) (“When the language . . . is clear, an insurance policy is interpreted according to its plain language and express terms, just like any other contract.”).
(24)Payne, supra, 269 Ga. at 363; Continental Cas. Co., supra, 266 Ga. at 262.
Should you like more information on this issue, please feel free to contact Christopher Reeves at The Finley Firm, at (404) 320-9979 or creeves@thefinleyfirm.com. Also available through Mr. Reeves is the GEORGIA ENVIRONMENTAL DESKBOOK, a manual of environmental issues, laws and regulations updated bi-annually and GEORGIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, a cheat sheet on the most common environmental laws in Georgia.